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"WE WILL TALK OF NOTHING ELSE" 
DAKOTA INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY OF 1837 
LINDA M. CLEMMONS 
D u r i n g  treaty negotiations with federal Indian 
agents in 1851, Taoyateduta (Little Crow), a 
Dakota representative, warned that the coun- 
cil members would "talk of nothing else" until 
conflicts related to the previous Treaty of 1837 
had been resolved. His statement is surprising, 
given that government officials at the time, as 
well as subsequent historians, have interpreted 
the Treaty of 1837 as a n  uncontroversial, even 
positive, event for both the Dakota and the 
federal government. However, Taoyateduta and 
Kev Words: Antebellum Indian Policv. Eastern , , 
Dakota, Indian Historiography, missionaries, Treaty 
of 1837 
Linda Clemmons is assistant professor of history at 
lllinois State University. Her current research focuses 
on the interaction of the Dakota and American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions missionaries during 
the antebellum period. This article would not have been 
completed without funding from the Newberry Library 
Spencer Foundation and a research grant from Illinois 
State University. 
[GPQ 25 (Summer 2005): 173-851 
the other Dakota did not view the Treaty of 
1837 in the same way. Instead, Taoyateduta's 
words illustrate the continued Dakota disillu- 
sionment and anger with the document, close 
to fifteen years after the Treaty of 1837 went 
into effect. 
Nearly thirty years ago, anthropologist Ray- 
mond D. Fogelson called for ethnohistorians 
to study Native interpretations of historic.al 
events.' As Taoyateduta's reaction to the Treaty 
of 1837 illustrates, this  admonition applies 
equally to the present day. Although in recent 
years ethnohistorians have integrated Native 
viewpoints into their work, many authors still 
take the assumptions of white government offi- 
cials as their starting point.2 The  Treaty of 1837, 
negotiated between the Mdewakanton band of 
Dakota (one of the four eastern bands of the 
Minnesota Dakota) and the  federal govern- 
ment, serves as a n  excellent case study in how 
Native recollections of events and the histori- 
cal record clash.3 Indian agents at the time, as 
well as subsequent historians, have ignored 
the  significance of the  Treaty of 1837. T h e  
Dakota, however, attributed great importance 
to the document, and consequences from the 
events of 1837 influenced their relations with 
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FIG. 1. Drawtng of "Little Crow" (Taoyateduta) 
by Frank B. Mayer. (Ayer Art Mayer Sketchbooks) 
Courtesy Edward E. Ayer Collection, The Newberry 
Llhrary, Chlcago. 
government officials and Protestant missionar- 
ies for decades to come. Indeed, the Treaty of 
1837 served as the  turning point in  govern- 
ment-Dakota relations, instead of the Treaty 
of 1851, which usually is assigned this role 
by historians. T h e  example of the Treaty of 
1837 illustrates that Native perspectives must 
be incorporated into the historical narrative 
before a more nuanced and complete story of 
Indian-white relations in  the antebellum era 
can emerge. 
At  first glance, there seems to be little con- 
troversy over the Treaty of 1837. In  fact, the 
sequence of events leading up to the  nego- 
tiation and signing of the  document is fairly 
straightforward, especially when compared with 
other antebellum treaties. The  Mdewakanton 
Dakota, like the Cherokee or Choctaw, signed 
treaties as part of Andrew Jackson's policy 
of Indian removal. According to this plan of 
removal, whlch began In the early 1830s, the 
federal government hoped to relocate all tribes 
living east of the Misslsslppi Rlver to areas west 
of the river. These newly vacated lands would 
then be opened for extracting resources (such 
as gold or timber), settlement, and cul t iva t~on.~ 
The  Mdewakanton Dakota, as the only Dakota 
band with villages on  the eastern side of the 
Mississlppl River, fell under the guidelines of 
this aggressive policy of removal. Indeed, as 
historian Gary Clayton Anderson argues, relo- 
catlng the  Mdewakanton Dakota across the  
Mlssissippl River would allow Andrew Jackson 
to nearly realize his ultimate goal of clearing 
the eastern lands for settlement and resource 
de~e lopment .~  
Wlth regard to the removal of the Mdewakan- 
ton Dakota and other tribes, however, Andrew 
Jackson and federal Indian officials not only 
justified the land cesslons In terms of the ben- 
efits that would accrue to settlers, land agents, 
and other investors, but they also insisted that 
the new federal Indian policy would help the 
Indians. According to thls reasoning, Indians 
needed to become civilized, which involved, 
among other things, settling o n  permanent, 
single-family farms, learning to speak, read, 
and wrlte English, following certaln gender 
roles, and converting to Chrlstlanlty. These 
things could not happen, the argument ran, 
because unscrupulous whltes Influenced the  
Indlans m negatlve ways. 
For example, fur traders encouraged Indlans 
to roam over large areas of land searching for 
animals, at the expense of learnlng about the 
benefits of cultivating small farms and living 
In permanent log cablns. Government offi- 
clals also worried about the amount of alcohol 
sold to the Indians by whlte traders. Agents 
argued that ~f the Indians were removed and 
placed on smaller tracts of land, they would be 
separated from amoral fur and liquor traders 
who did not have the Indlans' best interests at 
heart. Government officials could then watch 
over the Indlans untll they became sophisti- 
cated enough to separate themselves from the 
unscrupulous elements of whlte soclety. O n  
the reservations the Indlans could also attend 
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school, receive intensive training in farming, 
and learn about Christianity. To summarize, 
the reservations were seen as arenas for social 
change where Indians could learn to become 
civilized Christians. 
Federal Indian officials used all aspects of 
this preexisting rhetoric to justify opening nego- 
tiations with the Mdewakanton Dakota in 1837. 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs at the 
time, Carey A. Harris, stated that it would be 
"better for both the Indians and the citizens 
of this Territory" if the Mdewakanton gave 
up their claims to their lands located east of 
the Mississippi River. First, the Commissioner 
argued that the land was of no use to the Dakota 
because it "was barren of game, and unfit for FIG.  2. Drawing of Dr. Thomas Williamson by 
cultivation." Thus, the Dakota would be much 
~~~~k B. M ~ ~ ~ ~ .  ( A ~ ~ ~  M~ ~  sketchbooks) 
better off accepting Payments and goods for the Courtesy Edward E. Ayer Collection, The Newberry 
land, which would keep them from starvation. Library, Chicago. 
Second, the Commissioner stated that a treaty 
would save them from unscrupulous lumber 
companies. According to Harris, lumber com- 
panies gave the Mdewakanton "very inade- 
quate considerations" for their timber. This 
occurred because the Indians did not have 
"the intervention or supervision of any agent 
of the Government." The solution to the prob- 
lem seemed obvious to Harris: the government 
needed "to ~urchase the whole pine country at 
once, and to give them a liberal compensation, 
to be applied for their benefit, under the direc- 
tion of the Pre~ident."~ 
Finally, as an added benefit, Commissioner 
Harris argued that a treaty would aid the Indians 
by paying their "debts and claims" to traders, 
and by providing funds for "the education of the 
young, the supply of agricultural implements 
and assistance, [and] the employment of inter- 
preters, farmers, mechanics, and laborers" who 
would teach them civilized ways7 Clearly, the 
treaty would serve a civilizing purpose, whereby 
the government would promote agriculture and 
education among the Dakota. 
Despite the fact that the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs couched the treaty in terms of 
its numerous benefits to the Mdewakanton, 
various interest groups also influenced the gov- 
ernment's decision to press for a land cession in 
1837. Perhaps the most influential lobbyist was 
the lumber industry. Loggers clamored for unre- 
stricted access to the pine forests of not only 
the Dakota but also of the Ojibwe to the north. 
Moreover, traders supported a treaty because 
they wanted funds from the land sale to be used 
to pay the Dakotas' debts for trade goods. 
In theory, Protestant missionaries affiliated 
with the American Board of Commissioners 
for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) also supported 
a treaty. In 1835 the ABCFM, one of the larg- 
est and most influential missionary organiza- 
tions of the antebellum era, opened mission 
stations in M i n n e s ~ t a . ~  The organization sent 
Jedediah Stevens, Thomas Williamson, and 
their families to minister to the "savage" and 
"untamed" Dakota. Once they arrived in Min- 
nesota, Stevens and Williamson, aided by two 
independent missionary brothers, Gideon and 
Samuel Pond, immediately established stations 
near Fort Snelling (located in present-day St. 
Paul) and at Lac qui Parle (approximately a 
hundred miles to the west). These stations, how- 
ever, were expensive to construct and maintain, 
especially during times of financial uncertainty 
brought about by the Panic of 1837. Thus, 
the ABCFM missionaries hoped that treaty 
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money would be given to their organization to 
help defray the cost of constructing and run- 
ning their mission stations. Moreover, the mis- 
sionaries believed that  a land cession would 
concentrate the Mdewakanton in one place, 
which would provide them with greater access 
to potential converts. 
Finally, in addition to the Protestant mis- 
sionaries, some mCtis Dakota pressed for a 
treaty. In the previous Treaty of 1830, negoti- 
ated between the Dakota, several other tribes, 
and the federal government, the  mCtis had 
been given a tract of land lying by Lake Pepin 
for their use. Drawing on  their previous experi- 
ence, some metis saw a new treaty as a n  oppor- 
tunity to once again benefit materially, either 
through a further land cession or through direct 
cash  payment^.^ 
In the summer of 1837 pressure from these 
diverse groups combined to convince govern- 
ment officials to open treaty negotiations with 
the Mdewakanton. At this time, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Harris instructed the Dakota 
agent, Lawrence Taliaferro, to choose a group 
of Mdewakanton representatives to travel to 
Washington, DC, to meet with Indian offi- 
cials.'' Taliaferro carried out his orders and 
left the  agency o n  August 18 with a group 
of twenty-six Dakota. According to historian 
Roy W. Meyer, however, this delegation was 
not informed in advance that they would be 
discussing a land cession once they arrived in 
Washington. Instead, the group believed that 
the purpose of the trip was to negotiate a peace 
settlement with the Sac and Fox, with whom 
conflicts had arisen over the past few months." 
Once they arrived in Washington, the Dakota 
delegation met with Commissioner Harris and 
Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett. Lawrence 
Taliaferro also sat in on the negotiations. During 
the first meeting, which took place on September 
21, the group learned the true purpose of the 
negotiations; they had not been summoned pri- 
marily to settle differences with the Sac and 
Fox, but to sell part of their lands to the fed- 
eral government. Indeed, representatives of the 
Sac and Fox peoples had not even arrived in 
Washington yet. Standing Cloud, one of the 
delegates, expressed his dismay over this change 
in focus. He told the negotiators that "we never 
dreamed of selling our lands until your agent. . . 
invited us to come and visit our Great Father."12 
Despite the  misunderstanding, Poinsett and 
Harris pressed ahead and lost no  time in making 
an  offer for the lands. They demanded that the 
Mdewakanton cede all their lands lying east of 
the Mississippi River for $1 million. 
T h e  Dakota delegates did not accept the 
government's initial offer, and countered with 
the sum of $1.6 million for the same land ces- 
sion. Secretary Poinsett, however, refused to 
even consider their counteroffer, and remained 
firmly committed to his initial sum. The  reluc- 
tance of the government to negotiate prompted 
Good Road, another delegate, to comment that 
the whites must "love m ~ n e y . " ' ~  Despite their 
dissatisfaction with the proposal, once the del- 
egates realized that the terms of the treaty were 
non-negotiable, they accepted the  Secretary 
of War's initial offer. O n  September 29, 1837, 
they signed the document agreeing to the sale 
of approximately 5 million acres, encompassing 
"all their land, east of the Mississippi river, and 
all their islands in the said river."14 
In  return, the  Mdewakanton received $1 
million. Like all treaties of the era, however, 
the Dakota would not get this payment in one 
lump sum or in yearly cash payments equal 
to the  total amount. Instead, the  payments 
would be divided in  various ways. T h e  first 
clause of the treaty (which would later turn 
out to be the most confusing and controversial 
part of the  document) stated that  the  gov- 
ernment would invest $300,000 and pay the  
Mdewakanton "annually, forever, a n  income 
of not less than five percent . . . a portion of 
said interest, not  exceeding one third, to be 
applied in such manner as the President may 
direct." The treaty also promised to pay the metis 
("not having less than one quarter of Sioux 
blood") $110,000 and the traders $90,000 to 
cover Mdewakanton debts. The  Mdewakanton 
themselves would receive a yearly payment of 
goods for twenty years worth approximately 
$15,500.'~ Thus, although the Mdewakanton 
obtained some money and goods from their 
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land cession, the interests that had originally 
pushed for the treaty, including the mktis and 
traders, benefited from the final document. 
T h e  Treaty of 1837 also included clauses 
designed to promote the  government's civiliza- 
tion agenda among the Mdewakanton Dakota. 
Part  of t h e  land cession money would be 
used to purchase agricultural tools and to hire 
farmers, blacksmiths, and eventually, teach- 
ers. Specifically, $8,250 would be expended 
annually to purchase "medicines, agricultural 
implements and stock, and for the  support of a 
physician, farmers, and blacksmiths." Moreover, 
the Mdewakanton would receive a one-time 
payment of $10,000 in agricultural tools and 
other implements to enable them to imme- 
diately begin "break[ing] up and improv[ing] 
their lands."16 Although a majority in  the  
U.S. Senate supported the Treaty of 1837 and 
the government's civilization agenda, the doc- 
ument's ratification stalled in Congress due to 
the nation's precarious financial situation at 
the time. Finally, however, the Senate approved 
the  treaty o n  June 15, 1838, approximately 
nine months after its initial acceptance. 
INTERPRETING THE TREATY OF 1837 
Ever since the  Treaty of 1837's ratifica- 
tion, government officials and other interest 
groups at  the  time, subsequent historians, and 
Dakota affected by the  treaty have offered 
radically different interpretations of the docu- 
ment. These divergent responses ranged from 
those who stressed the unqualified success of 
the treaty (government officials and some his- 
torians), to those who denounced the  treaty 
as a crime against all Dakota (originally the  
Mdewakanton, and later the three other Eas- 
tern Dakota bands who joined in these vocal 
protests). T h e  ABCFM missionaries of the  
time occupied a middle position between these 
two extremes, supporting the  document in  
theory but finding fault with the way the gov- 
ernment carried out some of its provisions. 
From 1837 on,  sources existed to document all 
these interpretations, but the historical record 
has largely ignored that  of the Dakota (and 
to a lesser extent, the ABCFM missionaries). 
In order to fully assess the Treaty of 1837, all 
interpretations must be considered. 
Immediately after the treaty's ratification, 
antebellum government officials, including the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, touted the doc- 
ument as a positive achievement for the United 
States. After its ratification, Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Harris, in his December 1, 
1837, report, called the Treaty of 1837 a suc- 
cess because it secured "permanent boundar- 
ies" and a "more regular form" for the union.17 
Although the ceded Mdewakanton lands were 
a very small fraction of the  Dakota's total 
holdings in Minnesota, and the document was 
signed by only one out of the  four bands of 
Eastern Dakota, the Treaty firmly established 
a precedent for opening the  area to settle- 
ment. Indeed, prior to the treaty, as historian 
William Watts Folwell points out, no  lands in 
the Minnesota area had been open to settle- 
ment; all was Indian   err it or^." The  Treaty of 
1837 changed this forever. Thus, even though 
the  Treaty of 1837 did not receive as much 
press as other Indian removal treaties of the 
era, such as the Treaty of New Echota with 
the Cherokees, government officials believed 
that the Treaty of 1837 with the Mdewakanton 
would help to bring Andrew Jackson's policy of 
Indian removal one step closer to completion. 
Government officials also lauded the Treaty of 
1837 for its focus on civilizing the Mdewakanton. 
The money from the land sale bound the United 
States "to supply the Sioux, as soon as practica- 
ble," with medicines, agricultural implements, 
and stock, and to hire physicians, farmers, and 
 blacksmith^.'^ The  government farmers, along 
with the  agricultural implements, would be 
utilized to convert the Mdewakanton men from 
hunters into settled farmers. According to the  
parlance of the day, teaching the Dakota men 
to farm would lead them to self-sufficiency and 
away from lives of starvation and privation 
which supposedly corresponded with a hunt- 
ing exi~tence .~ '  The  treaty would also provide 
teachers to instruct the  next generation of 
Dakota in reading and writing in English and 
American civilization in  general. Eventually, 
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government officials claimed, these teach- 
ers would turn the  children into productive 
American citizens. 
Agent Lawrence Taliaferro, who was charged 
with carrying out the Treaty of 1837 on  the 
local level, did nothing to dispel the  fed- 
eral government's positive interpretation of 
the  document. In  his annual reports to the  
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Taliaferro 
continually stressed the  ease with which the 
Mdewakanton accepted the terms of the treaty. 
Taliaferro confirmed that  the  clause of the  
treaty requiring the Mdewakanton to vacate 
ceded lands and relocate on  the west side of the 
Mississippi River had been executed without 
incident or complaint. "After disposing of all 
their lands east of the Mississippi by the treaty 
of 1837, these people [the Mdewakanton] have 
been prevailed upon (such as had been residing 
east) to remove west," he wrote. This had been 
"arranged permanently," he  continued, "with- 
out expense or trouble [emphasis mine], and 
they now rest upon their remaining soil west" 
of the Mississippi ~ i v e r . ~ l  
Taliaferro also informed officials in Washing- 
ton that the Mdewakanton did not have any 
complaints about the  distribution of monies 
and goods promised in the  treaty. "The pay- 
ment of the annuity to the Sioux Indians was 
made to the heads of families, and as far as I 
have been informed, was entirely satisfactory to 
the nation," he  stated. "All of the bands of this 
tribe have, under the liberal provisions incor- 
porated in their treaty, been supplied amply 
with agricultural implements; well-qualified 
farmers have been assigned to each town, and 
two blacksmith shops put in blast at  points 
suited to the views and wishes of the ~ n d i a n s . " ~ ~  
Thus, federal officials in Washington, bolstered 
by Taliaferro's reports, called the Treaty of 1837 
a complete success. 
Although Lawrence Taliaferro and govern- 
ment officials in Washington penned glowing 
reports of the  Treaty of 1837 and its imple- 
mentation, ABCFM missionaries who lived 
closest to the  Mdewakanton Dakota became 
increasingly conflicted over the relative merits 
of the document. As already mentioned, the 
ABCFM missionaries at  first supported the  
treaty. Like the federal agents, the missionaries 
shared the desire to civilize and Christianize 
the Dakota and wanted to obtain government 
funds to achieve these goals. Just as they had 
hoped, the missionaries initially benefited from 
the Treaty of 1837. For example, ABCFM mis- 
sionary Gideon Pond was appointed to serve 
as the  government farmer-a position tha t  
had been created by the Treaty of 1 8 3 7 . ~ ~  T h e  
government's payment of Pond's salary freed 
up funds for investment in  other missionary 
activities. Moreover, in 1838 the  missionaries 
were pleased when Agent Taliaferro asked 
Washington to designate $5,000 of the  treaty 
funds for the  ABCFM schools.24 Again i n  
1839 the agent requested that  the  federal gov- 
ernment give $500 to the  ABCFM school at 
Lake ~ a r r i e t . ~ ~  
Despite the fact that the missionaries hap- 
pily accepted salaries and school subsidies from 
the treaty, they did not support all aspects of 
the document. At the same time Samuel Pond 
supported his brother's appointment as govern- 
ment farmer, he also criticized the Treaty of 1837 
for providing annuities to the Mdewakanton. 
Pond wanted to teach the  Mdewakanton to 
become self-sufficient small farmers, and h e  
strongly believed that  any handout of goods 
from the government would delay this process. 
Pond's comments about the subsequent Treaty 
of 1841 (which was negotiated and signed but 
never ratified) equally describes his reservations 
about the earlier treaty. Because the  Dakota 
would not have to work for the annuities, Pond 
believed that  these handouts would "render 
them indolent and dissipated." Annuities would 
allow them to "live without care, and waste 
their time in idleness and dissipation."26 
In addition to criticizing a central aspect of 
the Treaty of 1837, the missionaries disagreed 
with Taliaferro's appraisal of the Mdewakan- 
ton  satisfaction with the  document and its 
implementation. Taliaferro reported that  the  
Mdewakanton were happy with t h e  treaty 
and that its terms had been carried out to the 
satisfaction of all. The  missionaries, however, 
informed their home board in Boston that this 
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was far from the truth. First, the Dakota had 
been very upset over the delay in the treaty's 
ratification. Stephen Riggs, who had arrived in 
Minnesota in 1837 to minister to the Dakota, 
reported that "[o]wing to the delay in the ratifi- 
cation of the treaty last fall the Sioux here are, 
at present, in a very disturbed state. They can't 
conceive why the terms of the treaty should 
not be fulfilled."27 Worse yet, once the treaty 
had been ratified, the promised payments and 
goods did not arrive on time, despite Taliaferro's 
assurances to the contrary in his reports. All 
these delays and broken promises caused Riggs 
to worry that the Dakota would lose all "confi- 
dence in our go~ernment."~' 
If the Dakota lost faith in  the government, 
the missionaries realized that  they would be 
the  first to suffer the  consequences. In  the  
1830s the  Dakota (with reason) treated the  
missionaries as a n  extension of the federal gov- 
ernment. Thus, if problems arose over govern- 
ment policy, the missionaries, as the  closest 
government representatives, received the brunt 
of Dakota anger. Jedediah Stevens, who worked 
at the ABCFM mission, described this prob- 
lem. "The Indians about us for several months 
past have manifested much dissatisfaction 
and restlessness, occasioned principally by a 
delay in carrying into effect the Treaty made 
with them last fall," he  informed the ABCFM 
Secretary in Boston. As a result, the Dakota 
killed four of Stevens's mission cattle, which he 
estimated to be worth $ 1 0 0 . ~ ~  
When  analyzing the  Treaty of 1837, most 
historians have downplayed or ignored mis- 
sionary reports like Stevens's. Instead, they 
have treated the events of 1837 as relatively 
unimportant to the larger history of Dakota- 
government interaction. Two main reasons jus- 
tify this lack of interest in the Treaty of 1837. 
First, historians point out that the treaty was 
signed by only one of the four bands of Eastern 
Dakota. Moreover, the final land cession was a 
relatively small amount of land when compared 
with the total holdings of the Dakota at the 
time. As Minnesota historian William Folwell 
stated, the "little delta of territory between the 
Mississippi River and the St. Croix acquired by 
the treaty of 1837 was a trifling fraction of the 
immense domain embraced within the bound- 
aries of Minnesota by her organic act."30 
Second, the Treaty of 1837 was eclipsed by 
the  subsequent Treaty of 1851, whereby the  
four bands of Dakota signed away all their 
lands in Minnesota in return for a reservation. 
Historian Bruce David Forbes argued that the 
turning point in Dakota-government relations 
"was 1851, when the Dakota signed two treaties 
that ceded almost all of southern and western 
Minnesota to the United  state^."^^ Although 
historian Roy Meyer mentions that the Treaty 
of 1837 caused some hard feelings among the 
Dakota, especially when the government failed 
to deliver the promised annuities and payments 
on time, he ultimately agreed with Forbes that 
"the small cession made in . . . 1837 involv[ed] 
lands n o  longer extensively used by them," 
and was ultimately eclipsed by the subsequent 
Treaty of 1851.32 
While most historians have downplayed the 
significance of the Treaty of 1837, especially in 
relation to subsequent treaties, historian Gary 
Clayton Anderson, in  his book Kinsmen of 
Another Kind and article "The Removal of the 
Mdewakanton Dakota in  1837," extensively 
analyzed the document. In both of these works 
Anderson provided a well-researched history of 
the events of 1837; indeed, he provides needed 
context and explanation that other historians 
fail to mention in their brief summaries. In his 
interpretation of the circumstances leading up 
to the treaty, as well as the document itself, 
however, the  author echoed the  rhetoric of 
the government officials at the time. In both 
works Anderson stressed the benign nature of 
the treaty, as well as its numerous benefits to 
the Mdewakanton Dakota. Indeed, Anderson 
interprets the  Treaty of 1837 as a n  example 
of the positive results that  could arise from 
Jackson's policy of Indian removal.33 
Anderson argued that  Jacksonian Indian 
policy, at  least with regard to the  Dakota, 
should be viewed as a positive event because 
it saved the Mdewakanton. Prior to the treaty, 
Anderson stated that Dakota who resided and 
hunted on  lands east of the Mississippi were 
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starving. "Unfortunately," Anderson wrote, "the 
once bountiful herds of deer and buffalo had 
disappeared from the  vicinity by 1837, caus- 
ing severe food  shortage^."^^ Because of declin- 
ing buffalo, "some kind of governmental action 
was necessary to save the Mde~akanton." '~ The 
Treaty of 1837 provided annuities, which "did 
much to subsidize the meager economy of the 
hldewakanton, and they made up for the scar- 
city of guns and blankets."j6 Anderson called 
the annuity system a n  "overall success," once 
implemented, because it "obviously saved the 
Mdewakanton from utter de~truction."~' In the 
end, the Mdewakanton were better off a decade 
after the treaty went into force; it kept the tribe 
from starvation, provided educational opportu- 
nities, and ultimately "brought a certain degree 
of stability to the upper Mississippi Valley."38 
Dakota at the time, especially the Mdewa- 
kanton, would have challenged this interpreta- 
tion of the Treaty of 1837. First, the Treaty of 
1837 was a seminal event for them, and took 
on more significance as time went on. Far from 
bringing stability to the  Mississippi Valley, 
the document fomented protest, discord, and 
anger, among not only the Mdewakanton and 
the federal government, but among the three 
other bands of Dakota (the Sisseton, Wahpeton, 
and Wakpekute) who had not originally been 
involved in the treaty negotiations. Indeed, the 
Mdewakanton succeeded in establishing a loose 
alliance of Dakota villages across Minnesota 
united against the Treaty of 1837. Because of 
the significance that all four bands of Eastern 
Dakota came to attribute to the document, the 
Treaty of 1837 can be seen as one of the turning 
points in Dakota-white relations. 
From the very beginning, many aspects of 
the Treaty of 1837 angered the Mdewakanton. 
Some Dakota questioned the  underhanded 
method by which the Indian agents had con- 
ducted the negotiations; they pointed out that 
the delegates had been brought to Washington 
under false pretenses. Several Mdewakanton 
also were upset about the  concessions tha t  
had been given to the traders and mCtis, while 
others believed the selling price for the land 
was much too low. 
Once the treaty had been ratified, this ini- 
tial dissatisfaction only increased. Despite 
Taliaferro's assurances to the  contrary, t he  
promised annuities and payments did not arrive 
on time, and the Mdewakanton strongly criti- 
cized the government's inability to carry out 
their side of the bargain. Jedediah Stevens, the 
ABCFM missionary near Fort Snelling, com- 
mented that the Mdewakanton were extremely 
upset that parts of the Treaty of 1837 had not 
been carried into effect. "They manifest con- 
siderable dissatisfaction toward the Govt. Agent 
[emphasis his], Traders and whites generally," he 
explained, "and at present seem to occupy rather 
a threatening position."39 
Although delayed, the majority of the prom- 
ised annuities and payments eventually arrived 
and were distributed to Mdewakanton fami- 
lies. The  government, however, failed to follow 
through with one clause of the Treaty of 1837 
for the  next fifteen years. While seemingly 
minor, this provision took on  extraordinary 
significance and led to a significant break in  
relations between the  federal government, 
ABCFM missionaries living near their villages, 
and all four bands of Dakota. These problems 
continued from the early 1840s into the 1850s. 
The  disputed treaty clause stated that the 
government would invest $300,000 and pay the 
Mdewakanton "annually, forever, a n  income of 
not less than five percent . . . a portion of said 
interest, not exceeding one third, to be applied 
in such manner as the President may direct.'" 
In one sense, all involved parties agreed on  the 
meaning of the treaty clause-the government 
was required to spend $5,000 per year for the 
benefit of the Mdewakanton people. The  agree- 
ment ended there, however. Government offi- 
cials argued that during the treaty signing they 
had made it clear that the president would use 
the entire sum to pay for educational programs; 
they certainly never intended for the  presi- 
dent to give the money to the Mdewakanton 
to spend as they pleased. The  Mdewakanton, 
however, had a different understanding of the 
article's meaning. They told the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs "that at  the time of the treaty 
they were assured that  the  money would be 
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used for something other than education.'*' As 
both sides dug in and refused to compromise, 
tensions increased as the government failed to 
distribute the funds for several years in a row, 
until by 1850 the payments had accumulated to 
an  excess of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . ~ ~  
Although the majority of the funds remained 
unspent, the  ABCFM missionaries received 
several initial payments of the disputed money 
to help run their schools. This  angered the  
Mdewakanton, who charged that the govern- 
ment paid the  Protestants "for teaching the  
children here out of money due them . . . for 
their lands sold to the United States.lq3 Despite 
the fact that  the  missionaries promised that  
they no longer used any of the disputed funds 
by the early 1840s, Mdewakanton continued 
to believe that  the  ABCFM schools were "a 
scheme of the missionaries for making money 
out of them."44 
Because of these controversial school funds, 
t h e  Mdewakanton focused much of the i r  
anger over the Treaty of 1837 on  the ABCFM 
missionaries. Several other reasons also led 
the Dakota to direct their aggression at the  
Protestant missionaries instead of the federal 
government. First, the  ABCFM missionaries 
were simply a better day-to-day target than  
the federal agents, as they lived closest to the 
Dakota villages and interacted daily with men, 
women, and children as they worked to spread 
their message. Second, the missionaries did not 
have military support of their own to coun- 
ter any Dakota challenges to their authority. 
Finally, the Mdewakanton could express their 
anger over the Treaty of 1837 in a tangible way 
by targeting mission schools and churches. 
Because of their ease as a target, as well as 
their initial receipt of money from the Treaty of 
1837, attendance at the ABCFM schools located 
near Mdewakanton villages sharply declined 
beginning in 1839. Anti-treaty Mdewakanton 
used many different methods to keep students 
from attending classes. For example, angry 
Mdewakanton lined the path to the schools 
and attempted to intimidate the students into 
returning home. In other cases, parents who 
sent students to school were mocked, and in sev- 
eral cases even ostracized, by village members. 
As a result, attendance dropped precipitously. 
Jedediah Stevens reported that his school at 
Lake Harriet only had between five and eight 
students because of the growing anger over the 
Treaty of 1837. He expected things to get worse, 
predicting that "portentious [sic] clouds [hung] 
over the future" of the ABCFM mission.45 
Stevens's prediction proved to  be pre- 
scient, as anti-treaty Mdewakanton not only 
continued to harass mission schools located 
near their own villages throughout the early 
1840s, but also worked to spread their discon- 
tent to the three other bands of Dakota. A t  
first the  Mdewakanton focused their efforts 
on the  Wahpeton, as the band located clos- 
est to them geographically. In  1842 several 
Mdewakanton traveled to the Wahpeton vil- 
lage of Lac qui Parle to inform them about the 
conflict with the government and missionaries 
over education funds from the Treaty of 1837. 
They urged the Wahpeton to join their protest 
even though the treaty officially applied only to 
the Mdewakanton. In the end, the majority of 
Lac qui Parle Wahpeton chose to support the 
Mdewakanton in their dispute with the govern- 
ment and missionaries. Stephen Riggs reported 
that after meeting with the Mdewakanton, the 
Wahpeton immediately "ordered the mission- 
aries to leave." Much to Riggs's chagrin, this 
opposition "continued to embarrass our opera- 
tions till the treaty of Mendota in 1851.'q6 
The success of the anti-treaty Mdewakanton 
in convincing the Lac qui Parle Wahpetons 
to join their cause inspired them to spread 
their message to other Wahpeton, Sisseton, 
and Wahpekute villages located near mis- 
sion stations. They also worked to  keep the  
Mdewakanton united. To create and maintain 
this loose anti-treaty alliance, Mdewakanton 
emissaries traveled to communities near mis- 
sion stations. A t  each of these villages, the  
emissaries attended a council meeting, pre- 
sented their case against t he  ABCFM, and 
urged the members to unite with them in oppos- 
ing the  missionaries, and by extension, the  
Treaty of 1837. For example, in 1843 Thomas 
Williamson reported that "Tatepose has sent 
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word1' about the missionaries' role in the con- 
troversy over the Treaty of 1837 "as far as he  
could and that was his principal business when 
he was up [here] and they held those consulta- 
tions last spring.'*7 Likewise, Daniel Gavin, a 
Swiss missionary associated with the Societk 
des Missions ~ v a n ~ e l i ~ u e s  de Lausanne, warned 
Samuel Pond that  "Wakouta has just come 
down the  St. Peter again" to talk to other 
Mdewakanton near his mission at Red Wing. 
According to Gavin, Wakouta seemed deter- 
mined "to exert all his efforts to obtain the  
funds set aside" by the treaty for educational 
purposes. Missionaries like Williamson and 
Ciavin wished that  Wakouta and other emis- 
saries would "have been content with doing 
mischief in his own band" instead of spreading 
discontent to other villages.4' 
When the emissaries spoke at councils, they 
used many different arguments to convince the 
village members to join their cause. Most impor- 
tantly, they appealed to the cultural and kinship 
bonds between villages. In  1846 Williamson 
noted that a visiting Mdewakanton asked the 
villagers living near his station to "please their 
relatives" by joining in their protest.4' The  emis- 
saries also told the council members that the 
treaty crisis affected all Dakota people because 
the ABCFM stole money from the Treaty of 1837 
to fund all their mission schools, not only those 
located near the Mdewakanton. According to 
Thomas Williamson, "[s]ome ill disposed per- 
sons" told the Wahpeton that "we were paid 
for teaching the Warpetonwan here out of the 
money due the Mde~akantonwan."~'  Finally, 
the emissaries warned council members that the 
Treaty of 1837 created a dangerous precedent. 
If council members chose not to join the pro- 
tests, the government could sign similar treaties 
that would use Dakota funds to support mission 
projects. Because the Mdewakanton emissaries 
backed up their criticism with personal experi- 
ence, they made an  impact on  the councils. The 
federal government had indeed given some of 
the education funds to the ABCFM schools, had 
subsequently failed to distribute any funds, and 
had ignored the Mdewakanton interpretation of 
the education clause. 
For these reasons, the Mdewakanton emis- 
saries succeeded in convincing villages located 
near mission stations to join with them in  
opposing the  ABCFM missionaries. Letters 
and reports written by the  missionaries note 
the existence of such a loose alliance. In  1844 
Stephen Riggs reported that the Mdewakanton 
"have been making efforts to form a league 
among themselves against missions and schools. 
The Warpekute, Warpetonwan and Sisitonwan 
bands . . . have been imbibing too much of the 
same feeling; and some . . . have become open 
opposers. This is peculiarly true at Lac qui Parle."5' 
Riggs also noted that in the 1840s, a "strong orga- 
nized opposition grew up" among the Dakota "on 
the Mississippi and lower Minnesota.'"' 
Ten years later, the  government still had 
not released the disputed funds. As a result, 
the united opposition to the missionaries con- 
tinued throughout Dakota country. In  1850 
Thomas Williamson summarized the chilling 
effect that problems arising from the Treaty of 
1837 had on  missionary work, not only among 
the Mdewakanton but also at stations located 
near Sisseton and Wahpeton villages. As "the 
sum [from the education fund] increased," he  
wrote, "so have the difficulties from this source 
i n c r e a ~ e d . " ~ ~  These continuing problems over 
the Treaty of 1837 caused all Dakota villages, 
regardless of their involvement in the  origi- 
nal treaty negotiations, to distrust the federal 
government, and their proxies, the  ABCFM 
missionaries. 
Thus, when Dakota representative Taoyate- 
duta refused to "talk of nothing else" but the 
controversy over the  Treaty of 1837 during 
the  1851 negotiations for Dakota lands, h e  
was referring to a n  almost fifteen-year history 
of sustained conflict in the  upper Mississippi 
region. Taoyateduta's reference to the  united 
and long-running opposition of the  Dakota to 
the Treaty of 1837 illustrates that government 
officials at the time, as well as subsequent his- 
torians, have underestimated the significance 
of the document. The  Dakota did not see the 
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Treaty of 1837 as a n  insignificant or positive 
event, nor did they forget t he  document as 
they headed into new treaty negotiations with 
the government. Indeed, it can be argued that 
the Treaty of 1837 served as the turning point 
in government-Dakota relations, instead of the 
Treaty of 1851, which usually is assigned this 
role. By 1851 the Dakota had already learned to 
mistrust the government and to question their 
ability to follow through with promises made 
during treaty negotiations. 
As such, a study that includes Dakota reac- 
tions to the Treaty of 1837 not only adds another 
dimension to  the story of Dakota-white rela- 
tions in the antebellum period, it significantly 
alters t he  historical narrative. Without a n  
understanding of the Dakota response to the 
Treaty of 1837, Taoyateduta's words during the 
1851 negotiations remain elusive. However, his 
statement comes sharply into focus once the 
Dakota history of strong and sustained protest 
to the Treaty of 1837 is brought to light. A t  
the  same time, however, t he  positive inter- 
pretations by government agents at the time 
and by subsequent historians should not  be 
entirely dismissed. Rather, both stories should 
be integrated to form a further illustration of 
the miscommunications, misinformation, and 
conflicting agendas that  frequently character- 
ized Indian-government relations both during, 
before, and after the antebellum period. Only 
in this way can  the  volatile and conflicting 
relations between Indians and whites begin to 
become comprehensible. 
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